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We estimate the effects of fiscal policy on the labor market in US data. An increase in government
spending of 1 percent of GDP generates output and unemployment multipliers respectively of about
1.2 per cent (at one year) and 0.6 percentage points (at the peak). Each percentage point increase in
GDP produces an increase in employment of about 1.3 million jobs. Total hours, employment and
the job finding probability all rise, whereas the separation rate falls. A standard neoclassical model
augmented with search and matching frictions in the labor market largely fails in reproducing the size
of the output multiplier whereas it can produce a realistic unemployment multiplier but only under
a special parameterization. Extending the model to strengthen the complementarity in preferences,
to include unemployment benefits, real wage rigidity and/or debt financing with distortionary taxation
only worsens the picture. New Keynesian features only marginally magnify the size of the multipliers.
When complementarity is coupled with price stickiness, however, the magnification effect can be large.
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The strong response of ￿scal policy to the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-08 has ignited a lively debate on
the size (and sometimes even the sign) of ￿scal policy multipliers. Much of the attention in policy
circles has focused on the ability of government spending increases and tax cuts to boost output
and to reduce the unemployment rate. For instance, the background analysis to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (see, e.g., Romer, 2009) is explicit in its emphasis on the
ability of the ￿scal stimulus to ￿generate jobs￿ .1 Despite this emphasis on labor markets in policy
circles, the debate on ￿scal policy in the research community has focused instead largely on the size
of the GDP and consumption multipliers of government spending.2 Much less attention has been
devoted to the qualitative and the quantitative implications of ￿scal policy for the unemployment
rate and the labor market in general.
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, to provide an empirical estimate of both the output and
the unemployment multipliers of government spending in US data, focusing in more detail on the
transmission of ￿scal policy to the labor market. Thus, we investigate the e⁄ects on variables such
as labor market tightness (the ratio of vacancies to unemployment), the job ￿nding probability, the
separation rate, the extensive and intensive margins of work (respectively, employment and hours
per worker), labor force participation, and the real wage.
The second goal is to provide a theoretical framework that we can use to begin interpreting
these results. To this end, we start by incorporating search and matching frictions ￿ la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1995) in a dynamic general equilibrium real business cycle model, along the lines
of a recent literature pioneered by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005a).3 In this environment, we study
1According to Romer (2009, pag.2): ￿The President gave a very concrete metric: he wanted a program that would
raise employment relative to what it would be in the absence of stimulus by 3 to 4 million by the end of 2010￿ .
2A non-exhaustive list of papers in this literature includes Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido
and VallØs (2007), Perotti (2007), Ravn, Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2008), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Barro and Redlick (2009), Davig and Leeper (2009), Hall (2009), Nekarda and
Ramey (2009) and Ramey (2009). Hall (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009), and various IMF and
OECD publications provide useful comparisons of the multipliers estimated through various methodologies.
3See also Hagedorn and Manowskii (2008). This literature has exclusively focused on the e⁄ects of technology
shocks. Pioneering examples of models introducing labor search and matching frictions within an RBC framework
are Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Those studies, however, do not analyze ￿scal policy.
1the building blocks of the e⁄ects of government spending shocks on hiring, (un)employment and
output. We also study in detail the role of additional features such as: (i) the complementarity
between consumption and employment; (ii) the role of the wealth e⁄ect and of the elasticity of labor
supply; (iii) the role of real wage rigidity, distortionary taxation and government debt ￿nancing. We
then study how New-Keynesian features such as imperfect competition and time-varying markups
(resulting from nominal price rigidity) can interact with labor search frictions in a⁄ecting the size
of the unemployment and output ￿scal multipliers.
Our main results on the empirical side can be summarized as follows. First, in response to an
increase in government spending normalized to 1 percent of GDP, we estimate an output multiplier
well above one, in the range of 1.2-1.5 (at one-year and two-year horizon respectively); and an
unemployment rate multiplier of about -.6 at peak (in absolute percentage points). Second, hours
and employment (the extensive margin) also rise signi￿cantly, with a peak response of about 1.5
percent, whereas hours per employed individual (the intensive margin) do not change signi￿cantly.
Third, the job ￿nding probability and the separation rate both respond signi￿cantly. Fourth, the
real product wage rises by about 2.5 percent, whereas the markup falls by about 1.5 percent. The
responses of both variables, however, are not very precisely estimated.
On the theoretical side, we start by showing that a baseline real model with search and matching
frictions has fundamental di¢ culties in matching the estimated sizes of the unemployment and
output multipliers. A value of the former that matches the estimated multiplier can be obtained
only if a key parameter, the average relative value of non-work to work activities, is calibrated to be
in the high range of available estimates. In our model, such parameter governs the elasticity of the
hiring rate to changes in the marginal utility of wealth. Interestingly this parameter a⁄ects also the
elasticity of the hiring rate to variations in the marginal product of labor, and is therefore of critical
importance also for the quantitative e⁄ects of technology shocks on the unemployment rate (see
Shimer, 2009, and Hagedorn and Manowski, 2008). However, even when the value of this parameter
is calibrated to be in the high range, so as to roughly match the size of the unemployment multiplier
of government spending estimated in the data, the model clearly delivers an output multiplier well
below the estimated one.
2A recent literature shows that wage rigidity magni￿es the e⁄ects of technology shocks on the
unemployment rate (Hall, 2005a, Shimer, 2005, Gertler and Trigari, 2008). We show that in our
model real wage rigidity actually decreases the unemployment multiplier of government spending.
Similarly, a higher degree of complementarity between consumption and employment tends to
dampen the unemployment multiplier. Other modelling features that strengthen the realism of the
model, such as the presence of a non-leisure value of being unemployed (such as unemployment
bene￿ts or home production) and/or debt ￿nancing with distortionary taxation, all contribute to
reducing the unemployment and output multipliers of our baseline model.
We then introduce imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity. These features introduce
a new channel of ￿scal policy: countercyclical variations in the present value of markups, which
tend to boost the hiring rate. Within this context we obtain two main results. First, a search
and matching model augmented with NK features can magnify both the output and unemploy-
ment multipliers, but still delivers a size of the output multiplier largely below 1. Second, unlike
the baseline case with ￿ exible prices and perfectly competitive goods markets, a su¢ ciently high
degree of complementarity, coupled with price stickiness, can generate a crowding-in of private
consumption, and signi￿cantly boost the output multiplier.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) (BEF henceforth) is an earlier attempt to investigate,
both empirically and theoretically, the implications of changes in government spending for the labor
market. That study di⁄ers from ours in two dimensions. First, the empirical methodology: while
BEF employ a dummy-based narrative approach to identify exogenous innovations to government
spending (and defense spending in particular), we adopt a structural VAR approach based on
recursive ordering. Second, BEF analyze their results through the lens of a real business cycle
model with perfect labor markets, whereas labor search frictions are at the heart of our model.
Recent important investigations of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy are also Ramey (2009), which we
discuss extensively below, and Nekarda and Ramey (2009), who study the response of markups to
government spending shocks using input-output tables.4
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the results from the empirical analysis
4See Perotti (2007) for an earlier application of this methodology to the same issue.
3and provides a more general discussion on the methodologies that have been used in the literature to
estimate the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy. Section 3 presents the baseline model with search and matching
frictions and government spending. Section 4 provides the main intuition for the channels through
which government spending a⁄ect hiring and (un)employment. Section 5 presents the dynamic
e⁄ects of government spending shocks within a calibrated version of the model. Section 6 extends
the baseline model along a number of dimensions to assess the robustness of the quantitative results
and to highlight additional mechanisms. Section 7 introduces the most relevant deviation from
the baseline model by adding monopolistic competition and price stickiness, thus introducing an
additional channel through which government spending a⁄ects hiring. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Empirics
2.1 Identi￿cation and results
To investigate the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on labor market variables we estimate a VAR. We identify
government spending shocks on the basis of the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002): assum-
ing that there are decision and implementation lags of at least three months, government spending
cannot react to output and other shocks within a given quarter, hence in quarterly data govern-
ment spending is predetermined. We then identify government spending shocks via a Choleski
decomposition with government spending as the ￿rst variable. We discuss this approach in the
next subsection.5
Our benchmark speci￿cation includes the following variables: the log of real per-capita gov-
ernment consumption (i.e., current government spending on goods and services), the log of real
per-capita GDP, the log of real per-capita private consumption of nondurables and services, the
nominal interest rate on 3-month T-bills, and the average marginal income tax rate from Barro
and Redlick (2009); to this ￿xed set of variables we add one or two labor market variables in turn.
The sample is 1954:1 - 2006:4. The end date is dictated by the availability of the average marginal
5We choose to abstract from the analysis of the e⁄ects of government investment and/or taxation. These are for
instance an important component of the recent ARRA program in the US. Our goal is however not to provide a
quantitative assessment of the impact of that program.
4income tax rate; the initial date avoids the turbulent (from a ￿scal policy point of view) years
between 1945 up to the Korean War. The VAR also includes a constant and a time trend. To
partially address the issue of anticipated ￿scal policy, we also include lags 0 to 4 of each of three
dummy variables, taking values of 1 on each of the three ￿Ramey - Shapiro￿war dates included in
our sample: 1965:1, 1980:1 and 2001:4.6
In the ￿rst speci￿cation the labor market variables are the logs of total civilian employment and
total civilian hours, both divided by the civilian non-institutional population aged 16 to 64.7 Figure
1 illustrates the main results. The responses of government spending and private consumption are
expressed as percentage points of GDP; the initial shock to government spending is normalized
to 1 percentage point of GDP. The ￿gure displays the point estimate of the response, the median
response out of 1000 replications, and two-standard error bands, corresponding to the 25th and
975th replication at each horizon.8
GDP and private consumption both rise, with peak responses at about 1.6 and .7 percentage
points of GDP, respectively, after about two and a half years; at peak, both responses are signi￿cant
at the 95 percent con￿dence level. Employment and hours also rise signi￿cantly, with peak responses
of about 1.5 percent, again after about 10 quarters. As a result, the average number of hours per
employed individual does not change signi￿cantly.
In the next speci￿cation we add the log of total unemployment and the log of the civilian labor
force (both divided by population) to the ￿xed set of variables; the ￿rst three panels of Figure 2 (on
the ￿rst row) display their responses, as well as the implied response of the unemployment rate.9
6See Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Ramey (2009) argues that, because ￿scal policy is often anticipated, the Ramey
- Shapiro dummy dates help predict VAR shocks; by construction, our shocks are orthogonal to the Ramey - Shapiro
dummies up to 4 lags. Rossi and Zubairy (2009) also include these war dummies, but do not show impulse responses
based on this speci￿cation.
7These data were assembled by Valerie Ramey based on published and unpublished data from the BLS, and
kindly made available to us by the author. Results with total (including military) employment and hours are nearly
identical.
8The standard errors were computed using the MONTEVAR routine in RATS. Much of the existing literature
on ￿scal policy VARs has used one-standard error bands (a notable recent exception is Ramey, 2009); it is quite
possible that this tradition was initiated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Be as it may, we believe that this was a
mistake, and that there is no reason to use non-standard standard error bands. Thus, in this paper we display only
two-standard error bands.
9The response of the unemployment rate is constructed as the response of the log of total unemployment less the
response of the log of the labor force, multipied by the average unemployment rate over the sample.
5Unemployment falls, with a peak of about 10 percent again after 10 quarters, while the labor force
does not move signi￿cantly. As a result, the unemployment rate falls by about .6 percentage points
after 10 quarters.
In the third speci￿cation, we add both the logs of vacancies (measured by the Conference Board
help-wanted advertising index) and of total unemployment, both as shares of the population aged
16 to 64, and calculate tightness as the di⁄erences of these two responses. Vacancies (￿rst panel
of the second row) increase substantially, by about 12 percent at peak (the standard deviation of
the log change of vacancies is 34 percent). Combined with a decrease in unemployment which is
only slightly smaller in absolute value, this delivers an increase in labor market tightness by almost
20 percent, with a peak slightly later than 10 quarters. The response of tightness is marginally
insigni￿cant at the 95 percent con￿dence level.
The next panels display the responses of the job ￿nding probability and of the separation
rate, each added in turn to the ￿xed set of variables. Both variables are calculated from data on
unemployment and short-term unemployment as in Shimer (2005). The job ￿nding probability
increases, by about 3 percentage points at peak; the separation rate falls by about .12 percentage
points at peak.10 Both responses are just about signi￿cant at peak.
The last two panels display the responses of the real product wage and of the markup in
manufacturing. The former increases by about 2.5 percent after about two years, and returns to
trend very slowly. The latter falls by about 1 percent, but it is not estimated precisely.
Table 1 displays a few multipliers for GDP (from the speci￿cation with employment and hours as
labor market variables) and the unemployment rate (from the speci￿cation with labor force and total
unemployment as labor market variables; results from a speci￿cation with the unemployment rate
as labor market variable are nearly identical). The ￿rst two columns display the actual responses,
or the multipliers relative to the initial government spending shock, which is normalized to 1
percentage point of GDP. The next two columns display the cumulative multipliers. The cumulative
GDP multiplier at horizon X is computed as the cumulative percentage change in GDP after X
10The average values of these variables over the sample are 45.4 percent and 3.4 percent, with standard deviatiosn
of 6.5 and .5 percent, respectively.
6quarters, divided by the cumulative change in the government spending, expressed in percentage
points of GDP, at the same horizon. The unemployment multiplier is computed as the cumulative
response of the unemployment rate after X quarters divided by the same denominator.
After the second quarter, the GDP responses and the GDP cumulative multipliers are very
similar: both are well above 1, and on the high side relative to those estimated in the literature.
The unemployment rate responses and cumulative multipliers are also similar, ranging between
between -.4 and -.6 at year 2.










2 quarters .68 -.16 1.00 -.15
1 year 1.21 -.43 1.16 -.31
2 years 1.54 -.54 1.50 -.43
peak 1.60 -.64 - -
2.2 Discussion
The identi￿cation of government spending shocks has been the subject of a lively debate in recent
years.11 This debate has implications that go well beyond the econometrics, because di⁄erent
identi￿cation schemes can lead to very di⁄erent conclusions about the responses of key variables
to ￿scal shocks. To summarize why this is important, note that while virtually all models imply
that a surprise increase in government spending has positive e⁄ects on GDP (if taxes are not too
distortionary), in neoclassical models typically private consumption and the real wage decline, while
the opposite can occur in new-keynesian models. Hence, even though in this paper we do not focus
on the response of private consumption per se, clearly the responses of variables other than GDP
are important in assessing the mechanism underlying the channels of operation of ￿scal policy on
the labor market.
11See Perotti (2007) and Ramey (2009) for a summary of the issues.
7Some of our results appear prima facie consistent with new-keynesian models. However, one
potential problem with our approach to identi￿cation is that government spending changes that
appear unpredictable to the econometrician might well have been anticipated by the private sector:
the resulting estimated impulse responses may be biased. The only way to assess this issue is to
introduce actual forecasts, as Romer and Romer (2009) do for taxes. Ramey (2009) constructs a
detailed time series of revisions of expected future defense spending, from 1939 onward; she ￿nds
a positive e⁄ect of shocks to the revision of defense spending forecasts on GDP and hours, and a
negative e⁄ect on the consumption of nondurables and durables; these results seem more consistent
with a neoclassical model (although the manufacturing wage response is positive).
This approach is potentially fruitful, as one can argue quite plausibly that the changes in
defense spending identi￿ed with this method were exogenous. However, we like many others, are
skeptical that one can learn much about the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on consumption during a period,
like WWII, when nondurables were rationed and the production of many durables for civilian
purposes was e⁄ectively shut down for several years; similarly, it is di¢ cult to see what one can
learn regarding the e⁄ects on employment and hours when the draft and patriotism played such a
large role in labor markets. If one starts the sample in 1947, Ramey (2009) shows that the basic
qualitative responses survive, although the standard errors become larger.12 However, these results
hinge, for the post-war period, entirely on the Korean War; if one starts the sample in 1954, there
is no evidence of a decline in private consumption, and the standard errors become extremely large.
In fact, the results for the post-war period hinge entirely on just two quarters of the Korean War,
1950:3 and 1950:4, which were very special in several respects;13 it is enough to exclude these two
quarters for the impulse responses of durable and nondurables consumption to become positive or
￿ at, even though with very wide standard error bands.
Ramey also uses surveys of professional forecasters over the sample 1981:3 - 2008:4 and ￿nds
negative responses of private consumption (and now also of GDP) to expectation errors. Besides
12Standard errors calculated by the authors: Ramey (2009) does not report standard errors for the post-WWII
sample.
13See Perotti (2010) for a discussion of restrictions in place over these and subsequent quarters, like Regulation X
and Regulation W.
8displaying large standard errors, these estimates too are extremely unstable: it is enough to drop
the last two years of the sample (2007 to 2008) for the e⁄ects on GDP and consumption to turn
positive. In addition, Perotti (2010) shows that these shocks are not derived from expectations that
are e⁄ectively in the information set of the private sector; if one calculates the correct revisions to
the forecasts of future government spending, as actually held by the private sector, then one ￿nds
positive e⁄ects of government spending shocks on GDP, consumption and employment.14
Ultimately, whether anticipation e⁄ects are important is an empirical issue. Note that for
individuals that are liquidity constrained anticipated ￿scal policy is irrelevant; and indeed the
estimates of Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006) based on the 2001 tax rebate suggest that about
two-thirds of predictable changes in taxes and transfers are translated into consumption in the
quarter they are received and the next. Econometrically, Mertens and Ravn (2009) show that,
for a large class of models, a simple Choleski decomposition might deliver nearly correct impulse
responses even if shocks are anticipated by the private sector.
We realize, of course, that all identi￿cation schemes are questionable. We see the empirical
evidence we have presented as mostly a motivation for the theoretical analysis below. For those
who are unconvinced by our identi￿cation scheme, we think the best way to interpret the rest of
this paper is to see it as a study of the building blocks of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in a model with
search and matching frictions, with increasing levels of complications.
3 The model
There is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived workers and a continuum of in￿nitely-lived identical ￿rms,
each of measure one. Each ￿rm employs nt workers in the current period: To attract new workers
for the current period of operation it posts vt vacancies. Posting vacancies is costly: we assume
that hiring costs are linear in the number of vacancies. The total number of unemployed workers
searching for a job is ut = 1￿nt￿1.15 Following convention, we assume that the aggregate number
14However, inferences from these estimates are made di¢ cult by other issues discussed in Perotti (2010).
15All workers unemployed at the beginning of the period, ut, search for a job, that is, we abstract from labor force
participation choices.





t , where the parameter ￿m re￿ ects the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The
current probability that a ￿rm ￿lls a vacancy, qt, is given by qt = mt=vt = ￿m￿
￿￿
t , where ￿t ￿ vt=ut
is labor market tightness, the ratio of vacancies, vt, to searching unemployed workers, ut. Similarly,
the probability an unemployed worker ￿nds a job, pt, is given by pt = mt=ut = ￿m￿
1￿￿
t . Both ￿rms
and workers take qt and pt as given. Finally, each ￿rm exogenously separates from a fraction 1￿￿
of existing workers each period, where ￿ is the probability a worker ￿survives￿with the ￿rm until
the next period.
3.1 Firms
Every period, the representative ￿rm produces output, yt, using capital, kt; and labor, nt; according
to the following Cobb-Douglas technology yt = zk￿
t n1￿￿
t , where z is a common productivity factor.
Capital is perfectly mobile across ￿rms and there is a competitive rental market in capital.
Firms increase their current workforce nt by posting vacancies vt. The timing is as follows:
each ￿rm starts period t with nt￿1 employed workers; at the beginning of the period, ￿rms post vt
vacancies to attract new workers and ut = 1 ￿ nt￿1 workers search for jobs; the searching process
leads to mt new matches; then, a fraction 1￿￿ of workers employed at t￿1 is exogenously separated
from each ￿rm; separated workers cannot search until the following period; ￿nally, newly formed
matches, mt, become productive within the same period and are not subject to separations until the
following period. Total period-t workforce is then the sum of the number of last period￿ s surviving
workers, ￿nt￿1, and new hires, qtvt:
nt = ￿nt￿1 + qtvt: (1)
Let ￿￿t;t+1 be the ￿rm￿ s stochastic discount factor between period t and t + 1, where ￿ is the
household￿ s subjective discount factor and ￿t;t+1 is de￿ned below.16 Let wt be the real wage rate,
rk;t the rental rate on capital and ￿ the per period cost of keeping a vacancy open. The ￿rm￿ s
16￿t;t+1 is the period-t price of a consumption claim contingent on history up and including time t+1, and traded
at time t. See below for our assumptions on the structure of ￿nancial markets.
10problem can be then written:














equating the marginal product of capital to the rental rate.
Firms choose nt by setting vt. Taking the ￿rst order condition with respect to nt, making use
of the envelope condition to obtain @F (nt￿1;kt)=@nt￿1 and combining equations we obtain
￿
qt







where at ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)yt=nt is the marginal product of labor. Condition (4) equates the marginal cost
of hiring a worker with the marginal bene￿t. The latter is given by a discounted stream of ￿rm￿ s
expected future net earnings from the marginal worker.
For the purpose of the wage bargain it is useful to de￿ne Fn;t as the value to the ￿rm of having
an additional worker at time t after new workers have joined the ￿rm, i.e., after vacancy posting
costs are sunk. Di⁄erentiating F (nt￿1;kt) with respect to nt taking vt as given, using also the ￿rst




so that Fn;t may be expressed as the discounted stream of expected future pro￿ts per worker:
Fn;t = at ￿ wt + ￿￿Et f￿t;t+1Fn;t+1g: (6)
3.2 Households
We use the ￿family￿construct of Merz (1995). In particular, there is a representative household
consisting of a continuum of individuals of mass one. The household pools incomes and allocates
11total consumption across members to maximize the sum of utilities. As in Shimer (2009), assume
that the period-t utility function of a household member is
￿
c1￿￿
e;t (1 + (￿ ￿ 1)b)
￿ ￿ 1
￿






=(1 ￿ ￿) if unemployed, where ce;t and cu;t denote consumption of the
employed and unemployed members respectively, b > 0 is the relative disutility of work, and ￿ > 0
is a parameter that captures the degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure (with
￿ = 1 utility is separable).
The household has a diversi￿ed ownership stake in ￿rms which pays out pro￿ts ￿t, and pays
lump sum taxes to the government ￿t. The household may either consume (on average) ct or
accumulate capital kt through investment it according to
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + it(1 ￿ ￿t); (7)
where ￿ is the depreciation rate of capital, and ￿t is a function that captures adjustment costs






, with ￿(￿) satisfying ￿(1) = ￿
0
(1) = 0 and ￿
00
(1) > 0 in the steady state.
Thus, the representative household faces a single period-by-period budget constraint of the
form:
ct + it + Et f￿t;t+1Bt+1g ￿ wtnt + rk;tkt + Bt + ￿t ￿ ￿t; (8)
where ct = ce;tnt+cu;t(1￿nt) is average consumption of employed and unemployed workers and Bt
denotes the holding of real one period state contingent securities. Further, the household recognizes
that household employment is determined by the ￿ ows of its members into and out of employment
according to
nt = ￿nt￿1 + pt (1 ￿ nt￿1); (9)
where the household takes pt as given.
By taking ￿rst order conditions with respect to ce;t and cu;t one can show (see Shimer 2009)












12where ￿ is the discount factor, subject to the same budget constraint as before.
Let Ht be the representative household lifetime utility. Then the household maximization
problem may be expressed as




t (1 + (￿ ￿ 1)bnt)
￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿Et fH (nt;kt+1)g
￿
; (11)
subject to (8) and (9).
The ￿rst order necessary condition for consumption yields:
￿t =
￿




where ￿t is the marginal utility of wealth (i.e., the multiplier on the household￿ s budget constraint).
Equation (12) links the marginal utility of wealth to the marginal utility of consumption. The ￿rst
























rk;t+1 + ’t+1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
; (14)
where ’t is the shadow value of a unit of investment (the multiplier on (7)), ￿i;t is the derivative
of ￿(￿) with respect to it, and ￿t;t+1 = ￿t+1=￿t.
Using the envelope condition for employment, we derive the marginal value to the household
of having one member employed rather than unemployed, Hn;t, which is a determinant of the
bargaining problem:
Hn;t = ￿twt ￿ Un;t + ￿ (￿ ￿ pt+1)Et fHn;t+1g; (15)
where Un;t is the marginal disutility from work, given by
Un;t = ￿b
￿




Non-separability in utility makes Un;t time-varying: with ￿ = 1, we have Un;t = b.
Equation (15) indicates that the household￿ s shadow value of one additional employed member
13(the left hand side) has three components: ￿rst, the increase in utility generated by having an
additional member employed, given by the real wage expressed in utils; second, the decrease in
utility from lower leisure, given by the marginal disutility of work; third, the continuation utility
value, given by the contribution of a current match to next period household￿ s employment.
3.3 Marginal value of non-work activity














is the current marginal value of non-work activity. Importantly, this value does not only capture
the marginal value of leisure, but broadly the value of all non-market activities, including home
production and unemployment bene￿ts.







In our context the e⁄ect of the marginal utility of wealth ￿ on the value of non-work activity will
bear important implications for the transmission of ￿scal policy.
3.4 Nash bargaining and reservation wages
Each period, the ￿rm negotiates with the marginal worker over the surplus from the marginal
match. We assume Nash bargaining so that the wage wt is chosen to maximize the function
(Hn;t)
￿ (Fn;t)
1￿￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1] re￿ ects the workers￿bargaining power.
14The ￿rst order necessary condition for Nash bargaining is




where Hn;t=￿t is the marginal bene￿t to the household of one additional employed worker, expressed
in units of consumption goods. Nash bargaining implies that the worker and the ￿rm receive a
share of the surplus that is constant over time and determined by the relative bargaining power
￿. To see why, let Sn;t ￿ Hn;t=￿t + Fn;t denote the total surplus from a marginal match expressed
in units of the consumption goods. Then using (19) it is easy to show that Hn;t=￿t = ￿Sn;t and
Fn;t = (1 ￿ ￿)Sn;t.
The size of the surplus, Sn;t, is related to the size of the bargaining set, i.e., the gap between
the reservation wages: the minimum wage acceptable to the worker, wt, and the maximum wage
acceptable to the ￿rm, wt. More speci￿cally, we have
Sn;t = wt ￿ wt; (20)
with
wt = at + ￿￿Et f￿t;t+1Fn;t+1g: (21)
wt = !t ￿ ￿Et f(￿ ￿ pt+1)￿t;t+1Hn;t+1g; (22)
Intuitively, if the marginal value !t is higher, non-work activities become more attractive at the
margin, and the household￿ s minimum acceptable wage will rise. The household￿ s reservation wage
is then decreasing in the continuation value, for the household is willing to trade o⁄a lower wage for
a higher future continuation value from the match. Conversely, the ￿rm will be willing to increase
its maximum acceptable wage both if the current marginal product of labor is higher and its future
expected continuation value is higher.
The bargained wage in turn is a weighted average of the bargaining set limits, with weight equal
to the bargaining power:
wt = ￿wt + (1 ￿ ￿)wt; (23)
15where the higher is the worker￿ s bargaining power ￿ the closer is the wage to the ￿rm￿ s reservation
wage and vice versa.
3.5 Surplus
Combining equations (6) and (15) with the Nash rule (19), we can write a recursive expression for
the total surplus as follows:
Sn;t = at ￿ !t + ￿Et f(￿ ￿ ￿pt+1)￿t;t+1Sn;t+1g: (24)
The surplus derived from the match depends on two terms: ￿rst, the current gap between the
marginal product of labor and the marginal value of non-work activities; second, the future surplus
from the match, conditional on the same match surviving next period, net of the worker￿ s future
surplus from a match in case of break up, conditional on ￿nding a job.






t = (1 ￿ ￿)Sn;t (25)
Equation (25) shows that that the ￿rm￿ s hiring rate depends directly on the size of the surplus
derived from the match. Finally, combining equations it is useful to rewrite (25) in terms of market












Notice that for ￿ ! 0 the previous expression reduces to the standard condition equating the
current marginal product of labor to the current marginal value of non work activity. The same
occurs if the e¢ ciency of the matching process improves, i.e., ￿m ! 1. In both cases the model
with search and matching frictions converges to the frictionless economy without matching frictions.
163.6 Government policy and resource constraint
Lump sum taxes adjust to balance the government budget constraint:
￿t ￿ gt = 0; (27)
where government spending, gt, follows the exogenous stochastic process:
loggt = (1 ￿ ￿g)loggy + ￿g loggt￿1 + "g;t; (28)
with "g;t i.i.d. and where gy = g=y denotes the steady state share of government spending in output.
By combining (27) with (8), and recalling that in equilibrium Bt = 0 for all t, we obtain the
aggregate resource constraint:
yt = ct + gt + it + ￿vt: (29)
4 Model properties
In order to better inspect the mechanism driving the short-run e⁄ect of variations in government
purchases on the labor market, it is useful to take a log-linear approximation of (26) and write
b ￿t =
￿























where   ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿p) > 0, and a hat denotes the percentage deviation of a variable from its steady













Notice that ! is increasing in b, the relative disutility of work, and decreasing in ￿, the marginal
utility of wealth. We will show below that the value of the parameter ! is critical in determining
the size of the government spending multipliers, both for output and unemployment.
Equation (30) reveals that variations in government spending a⁄ect the surplus and, in turn,
17the hiring rate via three channels: (i) a marginal value of work channel, (ii) a real interest rate
channel, and (iii) a capital accumulation channel.
The intuition works as follows. Consider a temporary rise in the present value of government
spending, and therefore of taxes. This induces a tightening of the household￿ s budget constraint,
captured by a rise in ￿t, and lowers the value of non-working activity !t, which raises the surplus
Sn;t. In turn, this raises Fn;t and the hiring rate ￿t.
There are two key parameters that determine the size of this e⁄ect. This can be seen by
extrapolating the term [!=(1 ￿ !)] b !t from expression (30). In particular we can write:
!
1 ￿ !






Hence a rise in the shadow value of wealth lowers the marginal value of non-work activities !t with
elasticity 1=￿. In turn, a variation in !t a⁄ects the surplus, and thus tightness, via an elasticity
that depends on !.
The channel a⁄ecting the marginal value of work competes, however, with two additional, and
counter-acting, channels. For one, since the shock is temporary, the rise in the shadow value of
wealth pushes the equilibrium real interest rate up. In turn, this produces a fall in the discounted
marginal bene￿t from new vacancies (for given wages and given marginal product of labor): this
e⁄ect discourages hiring. The presence of capital accumulation adds an additional e⁄ect. A lower
expected future capital stock (due to the fall in current investment) implies a lower marginal product
of labor, thereby further discouraging hiring.
Equation (30) reveals three key di⁄erences between a model with labor search frictions and a
standard neoclassical growth model. First, while in the latter the employment decision is taken,
in each period, to equate the marginal product of a new worker to the marginal disutility of labor
(normalized by the marginal utility of consumption), in our model, due to the presence of hiring
frictions, the hiring rate is a forward-looking variable. Second, the presence, in our context, of a
real interest rate e⁄ect - that is absent in the neoclassical growth model - and follows from the
hiring decision being forward-looking. Third, the presence of a ￿marginal value of non work e⁄ect￿ ,
18that di⁄ers from a standard wealth e⁄ect on labor supply. Our model, in fact, does not feature an
endogenous margin in labor hours. Hence the value of non-work activity captures the cost in terms
of the joint surplus of increasing the number of employed members at the margin.
The role of the relative value of non-work activities As suggested above the e⁄ect of
variations in government spending on market tightness is larger the higher is !, the average value
of non-work relative to work activities. When the (steady-state) marginal value of work activities,
a, is close to the (steady-state) marginal value of non-work activities, ￿b￿￿1=￿, the average joint
surplus from the marginal match is small. Since ￿rms obtain a constant share 1 ￿ ￿ of the joint
surplus, the average pro￿t from hiring an additional worker is also small. In this case, changes in
either the marginal product of labor or in the marginal value of time will have a high leverage on
the pro￿t from the marginal match. Even small changes in the marginal value of time, induced by
small changes in government spending through small changes in the marginal utility of wealth, will
cause a very large change in ￿rms￿pro￿ts in percentage terms, and thus induce very large changes
in ￿rms￿hiring activity.
The role of the average relative value of non-work to work activity, !, has been emphasized in
the literature initiated by Shimer (2005) focusing on the ability of the search and matching model
to generate a large response of hiring activity to productivity shocks. Not surprisingly, a high value
of ! is key for the result in Hagedorn and Manowskii (2008) who argue that a standard Mortensen
and Pissarides type of model (driven only by productivity shocks) can replicate the volatility in
(un)employment observed in the data absent wage rigidity.
To summarize, a large steady-state value of non-work relative to work activity reduces the
average surplus and thus makes it easier to generate large labor market ￿ uctuations to any shock
a⁄ecting the surplus. In other words, employment is highly elastic to driving forces. This is also
equivalent to assuming that employment is strongly wage elastic: even a small variation in the real
wage can generate large ￿ uctuations in equilibrium (un)employment. One can think of ! as a key
determinant of the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin, playing a similar role to the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply at the intensive margin. However, while the latter is a preference-
19based parameter, which household data indicate to be small (see Hall, 2009, for a survey), the
former connects employment and the wage in equilibrium and depends on a number of parameters
in a convoluted way.
5 Dynamic simulations
In this section we simulate a quantitative version of the model. Our goal is to quantify the size of
the unemployment and output multiplier in the baseline version of the model when all the channels
of variations in government spending are at work: the marginal value of time channel, the real
interest rate channel and the capital accumulation channel. To this end a thorough discussion of
our calibration strategy is crucial.
5.1 Calibration
The job ￿nding rate in the US is typically quite high, so unemployed workers on average ￿nd a job
within a quarter. To properly capture this feature of the data, we choose to calibrate the model at
a monthly frequency.
There are twelve parameters to which we need to assign values. Three are conventional in the
business cycle literature: the discount factor, ￿, the depreciation rate, ￿; and the share parameter
on capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function, ￿. We use conventional values for all these
parameters: ￿ = 0:991=3, ￿ = 0:025=3, ￿ = 1=3. We assume that the investment adjustment cost
function is convex and given by ￿(￿) ￿ (￿k=2)(it=it￿1 ￿ 1)
2, and choose ￿k = 3:24 following the
estimates of Christiano et al. (2005). Note that in contrast to the frictionless labor market model,
the term 1 ￿ ￿ does not necessarily correspond to the labor share, since the latter will in general
depend on the outcome of the bargaining process. However, because a wide range of values of the
bargaining power imply a labor share just below 1￿￿; here we simply follow convention by setting
1￿￿ = 2=3.17 We set the value for the government spending autoregressive parameter, ￿g = 0:91=3,
in line with our VAR estimates.
17In our baseline calibration, for example, 1 ￿ ￿ equals 0:6667 and the labor share 0:6618.
20There are ￿ve parameters that are speci￿c to the search and matching framework: the job sur-
vival rate, ￿, the e¢ ciency parameter in matching, ￿m, the elasticity of matches to unemployment,
￿, the bargaining power parameter, ￿, and the hiring cost parameter, ￿; and two parameters that
describe preferences: the parameter governing the degree of complementarity in consumption and
labor, ￿, and the parameter capturing distaste for work, b.
We choose the average monthly separation rate 1 ￿ ￿ following Shimer￿ s (2005) calculations,
according to which jobs last about two years and a half. Therefore, we set ￿ = 1 ￿ 0:035. We
choose the elasticity of matches to unemployment, ￿, to be equal to 0:5, the midpoint of values
typically used in the literature. This choice is within the range of plausible values of 0:5 to 0:7
reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) in their survey of the literature on the estimation of
the matching function. To maintain comparability with much of the existing literature, we impose
symmetry in bargaining and set ￿ to be equal to 0:5. This choice also guarantees that the Hosios
(1990) condition for e¢ ciency is satis￿ed. We then set the i) the adjustment cost parameter, ￿, ii)
the disutility of work parameter, b, and iii) the e¢ ciency parameter in matching, ￿m, to target i)
the average job ￿nding probability, p, ii) the ratio of the marginal value of time to the marginal
product of labor, !, and iii) the average value of market tightness, ￿. We choose p = 0:45 to match
recent estimates of the U.S. average monthly job ￿nding rate (Shimer, 2005). We set ￿ = 0:5, close
to the values that can be obtained from measures of vacancies in JOLTS. Note however that the
choice of ￿ implies a normalization.18
18Doubling the target for average tightness ￿ will reduce in half the hiring cost parameter ￿, reduce in half the job
￿lling probability q, and double the average vacancies v, without a⁄ecting the dynamics of the model.
21Table 2. Baseline calibration
Discount factor ￿ 0:991=3
Capital depreciation rate ￿ 0:025=3
Share of capital in prod. function ￿ 0:33
Investment adjustment cost parameter ￿k 3:24
Gov spending autoregressive parameter ￿g 0:91=3
Survival rate ￿ 0:965
Elasticity of matches to unemployment ￿ 0:5
Bargaining power parameter ￿ 0:5
Complementarity parameter ￿ 1
Matching function constant ￿m set to target ￿ = 0:5
Adjustment cost parameter ￿ set to target p = 0:45
Unemployment ￿ ow value b set to target ! = 0:9
Perhaps most controversial is the choice of !. In the baseline calibration we set ! = 0:9 in the
high side of the range of sensible values, but we provide a discussion at the end of the section. We
calibrate the complementarity parameter ￿ to 1, which corresponds to the separable utility case,
but we explore the role of non separability further below.
Our baseline parameterization is summarized in Table 2. Given the crucial role of the parame-
terization of !, we discuss its interpretation within the model and we describe the values that have
been adopted elsewhere in the literature. Notice, ￿rst, that our calibration strategy implies that
larger values for !, other things equal, correspond to smaller search frictions. To see this, write the
steady state version of equation (26),
￿￿￿1
m ￿￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ !)
1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿p)
;
which equates the ￿rm expected cost of hiring a worker to the ￿rm￿ s share of the surplus from the
match. For given choices of ￿, ￿, ￿ and p, when the marginal value of time is closer to the value
of work, i.e., when ! = !=a is larger, the surplus from the match is smaller and so is the share
accruing to the ￿rm. This implies that in equilibrium the cost of hiring a worker or, equivalently,
the size of search frictions must also be smaller.19
19In the model, search frictions can become smaller because either ￿ decreases or ￿m increases. Our calibration
strategy implies that larger value of ! results in a lower value of ￿.
22There has not been much consensus in the recent literature on how to calibrate the value of
non work to work activities or, alternatively, other measures of the size of search frictions. Shimer
(2005) assumes that the value of non work activities (interpreted as only unemployment bene￿ts)
is far below what workers produce on the job and set ! to 0:4. This view is shared by Hall (2005b),
but is in stark contrast with Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) who argue in favor of values of !
close to 0:95. In subsequent work, Hall proposes intermediate values by interpreting the bene￿t
from non work activities as re￿ ecting not only unemployment insurance but also utility gains from
leisure. Shimer (2009) refers to evidence in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Silva and Toledo
(2008) on the wage cost of recruiting a new worker. He chooses to target a cost of recruiting a
worker equal to 4 percent of a worker￿ s quarterly wage. Others instead choose to target the share of
total hiring costs on output. Andolfatto (1996), for example, targets a 1 percent share of recruiting
expenditures to output.
Note that, for given values of ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, and p, targeting the cost of hiring a worker in terms of
wages, (￿￿￿1
m ￿￿)=w, or the share of total hiring costs to output, ￿v=y, is equivalent to targeting !,





(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿p)
Using these relations and with the purpose of making comparison across papers, Table 3 con-
siders four possible values for ! and reports the implied values for both the cost of hiring a worker
in terms of quarterly wages and the ratio of hiring costs to output. The table shows that setting !
to 0:4 implies that hiring a worker uses about 40 percent of a worker￿ s quarterly wage (ten times
as large as the value in Shimer, 2009). It also implies that the share of total recruiting costs on
output is as large as 2:7 percent. When ! is increased to 0:9, then hiring a workers takes about 6:5
percent of the quarterly wage and the share of overall hiring costs to output is 0:44 percent. This
case is closer to the calibration in Shimer (2009).
23Table 3. Implications of di⁄erent values for !
Relative value of non work activity to work activity ! 0:4 0:75 0:9 0:95
Ratio of per worker hiring costs to quarterly wages (percent)
￿￿￿1
m ￿￿
3w 39:8 16:2 6:4 3:2
Ratio of total hiring cost to output (percent) ￿v
y 2:67 1:11 0:44 0:22
We ￿nally choose a baseline value of ! = 0:9, in the high side of the range of values considered
in the literature. This requires setting ￿ = 0:61 and b = 1:16, where the latter also depends on the
parameter that captures the complementarity.
5.2 Baseline results
Figure 3 illustrates the key dynamics at work in our model. It displays impulse responses to an
increase in government spending corresponding to one percent of steady state output. All responses
are expressed in percentage deviations from respective steady state values, with the exception of
the unemployment rate that is expressed in absolute percentage points.
A rise in government spending produces a rise in the total surplus from the match. That
the surplus is rising can be inferred from the behavior of the reservation wages, with the ￿rm￿ s
reservation wage rising and the household￿ s falling: hence the response of both reservation wages
contributes to the widening of the surplus area. The ￿rm￿ s reservation wage rises because, despite
the fall in the marginal product of labor, the expected discounted continuation value from the
match increases. The household￿ s reservation wage falls both because the current relative value of
non-work activity !t falls and because the expected continuation value rises. The relatively larger
fall in the household￿ s reservation wage induces a fall in the bargained wage.
Figure 4 displays impulse responses of key selected variables to the same percentage increase
in government spending as above. The responses of consumption and investment are expressed in
percentage points of steady state output. The increase in government spending leads to a signi￿cant
24rise in market tightness and a fall in unemployment of slightly more than 0:2 percentage points at
the peak, less than our SVAR estimates. Output increases by about 0:2 percent at the peak, much
less than estimated from the SVARs. Consumption falls by about 0:9 percent, in contrast with our
empirical evidence which shows consumption to increase. Investment falls by almost 0:4 percent at
the peak, and the real wage falls initially by 0:3 percent relative to baseline.
Figure 5 reports both output and unemployment multipliers (calculated at di⁄erent horizons)
implied by our simulation. The output multiplier at horizon j is measured as the ratio between the
cumulated impulse response of output and the cumulated response of government spending both at
horizon j (expressed in units of steady state output). The unemployment multiplier is computed
as the fall in unemployment at the peak expressed in percentage points. The ￿gure illustrates how
both multipliers vary with parameter !. We let ! vary between 0:4, which is the value advocated
by Shimer (2005), and 0:95 which is about the value indicated in Hagedorn and Manowski (2008).
We report two horizons for the output multiplier: impact and one-year. We see that the value of
! has a critical e⁄ect on the size of both multipliers. For values of ! close to 0:4 both the output
and the unemployment multipliers are close to zero
A main result is that at all horizons the output multiplier is quite small, largely below 1.
This ￿nding is remarkable because it is obtained in the context of a model in which the implicit
employment elasticity is high (as implied by the calibration of ! = 0:9). The main reason for the
small size of the output multiplier relies in the behavior of investment, which falls over time in
response to the increase in government spending. Conversely, the unemployment multiplier can get
su¢ ciently close to our SVAR estimates if the value of ! is su¢ ciently high.
The main implication of this section is that if we accept that a reasonable value for ! should
be in the high range (close to 0:9) then a neoclassical model augmented with search and matching
frictions can generate unemployment multipliers that match our estimates fairly closely, whereas
the output multipliers remain largely below our estimates.
256 Extensions
In this section we illustrate a series of modi￿cations that have important implications for the size
of the unemployment and output multipliers. Understanding how they work is important in order
to highlight the channels of operation of ￿scal policy in this model.
6.1 Non-separability
A recent literature has advocated non-separable preferences as a desirable feature of business cycle
models of the labor market. Shimer (2009) argues that the marginal utility of consumption being
dependent on work e⁄ort is consistent with microeconomic models of time allocation (Becker, 1969).
Hall (2009) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue in favor of preferences that imply that the marginal
utility of consumption rises at higher levels of hours worked.20
Figure 6 explores the implications of non-separability for the output and unemployment multi-
pliers in our framework. The ￿gure displays, for alternative values of ￿, impulse responses of output
and unemployment to a shock to government spending of the same size as in the previous exercises.
The solid line corresponds to the baseline case of separable utility (￿ = 1) analyzed earlier.
In the top panel we set ! = 0:4, whereas in the bottom panel we set ! = 0:9. Clearly,
complementarity between consumption and employment dampens the size of both multipliers. In
a number of cases, high values of ￿ even imply a change in the sign of the multiplier. The intuition
for this result is that higher complementarity makes the marginal value of non-work activity less
sensitive to the marginal utility of wealth. In fact, the (absolute) value of the elasticity of !t to ￿t
is 1=￿, which is decreasing in ￿. Hence, for any given increase in the marginal utility of wealth (due
to higher taxes), the higher is ￿ the smaller the fall in the marginal value of non-work activity, and
hence the smaller the e⁄ect on the total surplus. In turn, this a⁄ects negatively equilibrium hiring.
This result is somehow the analog, within a search and matching model, of a similar result
obtained in Monacelli and Perotti (2008), who show, within a neoclassical model with non-separable
preferences, that the intensity of the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply is negatively related to the degree
20Hall (2009) refers to substantial evidence that consumption falls when hours of work fall, e.g., because of retirement
or unemployment.
26of complementarity between consumption and hours.
6.2 Unemployment bene￿ts
So far we have assumed that the ￿ ow bene￿t from being unemployed only comes in the form of leisure
gains. However, more generally, the ￿ ow value of unemployment can either include unemployment
insurance collected from the government or a bene￿t from producing at home or in an informal
market activity. These components are typically modelled in the literature as a ￿xed monetary
bene￿t per unemployed worker. Since in our model the key channel through which increases in
government spending stimulate hiring activity is via changes in the value of time, how we interpret
the ￿ ow value of unemployment has important implications.
In this section we interpret the ￿ ow unemployment bene￿t not only as leisure value but also as
unemployment insurance (which is equivalent to interpreting the bene￿t as home production). The
introduction of unemployment bene￿ts in the model modi￿es the household￿ s budget constraint to
include an additional term, as follows:
ct + it + Et f￿t;t+1Bt+1g ￿ wtnt + bu (1 ￿ nt) + rk;tkt + Bt + ￿t ￿ ￿t; (33)
where bu is the value of unemployment bene￿ts per unemployed worker. This will cause a change
in the value of an employed household￿ s member, Hn;t, in turn implying that the total surplus
becomes
Sn;t = at ￿ (￿b￿
￿1=￿
t + bu) + ￿Et f(￿ ￿ ￿pt+1)￿t;t+1Sn;t+1g; (34)
where the value of non-work activity is now the sum of two components: the marginal rate of
substitution, ￿b￿
￿1=￿
t , and the unemployment insurance, bu. With the purpose of understanding
the e⁄ects of government spending shocks, the key aspect is that only the ￿rst component is
a⁄ected by variations in the marginal utility of wealth. This implies that in the extreme case
where we interpreted the ￿ ow value of unemployment as only unemployment insurance (or home
production), the channel working via the marginal value of non-work activities would be absent. A
rise in government spending would then unambiguously lead to a decrease in hiring, employment
27and output, as a consequence of the real interest rate and capital accumulation channels.
To explore the quantitative e⁄ects of allowing for unemployment insurance in the model, we








We then modify the calibration as follows. We keep !b = 0:9 and we choose bu so that the average
replacement ratio, bu=w, is 0:4, similarly to Shimer (2005). In fact, since the average marginal
product a is close to the average wage w, this implies that bu=a is close to bu=w. It also implies
that (￿b￿￿1=￿)=a is close to 0:5.
Figure 7 compares the response of output and unemployment to a government spending shock
in the baseline case (where the ￿ ow unemployment bene￿t is interpreted only as the value of leisure)
to the case where we also allow for unemployment insurance. As expected, the implied multipliers
are lower in the case with unemployment insurance. The reason is simple: if bu > 0, holding
!b constant implies setting a lower value of !, and the e⁄ect on the surplus of variations in the
marginal utility of wealth is dampened.
6.3 Wage rigidity
While the Nash rule is a natural way to split the surplus in search models, any wage within the
bargaining set could in theory be an equilibrium outcome of the negotiation. This key observation
has led a number of researchers, starting with Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005a), to investigate the
role of rigid wages in search models.
As long as the (rigid) wage remains in the bargaining set, wage rigidity has no e⁄ect on the
decision to form or continue a match once a worker and a ￿rm have met. However, wage rigidity
a⁄ects the rate at which ￿rms post vacancies to attract new workers since it in￿ uences ￿rms￿
expected gains from hiring a worker. Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005a) show that wage rigidity
signi￿cantly ampli￿es the cyclical response of hiring activity to productivity shocks.
Figure 8 illustrates this point. A positive productivity shock generally a⁄ects the bargaining
28set in two ways: it tends to increase its size (as the match surplus increases) and tends to shift it
toward higher wages (as both reservation wages, wt and wt, generally increase). The rigid wage,
then, moves toward the lower (upper) limit of the bargaining set in expansions (recessions), so that
hiring incentives are high (low). Wage rigidity (illustrated by the vertical dashed line) ampli￿es the
employment response to productivity shocks by making the ￿rm share of the surplus procyclical,
so that hiring is encouraged in booms and discouraged in recessions.
The e⁄ect of wage rigidity on hiring incentives in response to government spending shocks is in
general, however, of the opposite sign. Consider a positive government spending shock that raises
hiring and employment (that is, one for which the net e⁄ect of the three channels analyzed above
is expansionary), as it is the case under our baseline calibration. The shock increases the size of
the bargaining set (as it raises the surplus). As we have seen above, while the ￿rm￿ s reservation
wage wt rises in response to the shock, the worker￿ s reservation wage wt falls. Under our baseline
calibration, the reduction in the workers￿ s reservation wage is large enough relative to the increase
in the ￿rm￿ s reservation wage so that the ￿ exible Nash bargained wage falls. In equilibrium, both
the ￿rm￿ s and the worker￿ s shares of the surplus remain constant in equilibrium.
Suppose now, for the sake of illustration, that the real wage is strictly ￿xed (once again to the
level indicated by the dashed vertical line in ￿gure 8). In this case the ￿rm￿ s share of the surplus
will decrease in response to positive government shocks, thereby discouraging hiring. Hence, in
general, wage rigidity will dampen the e⁄ect of government spending shocks on hiring.
To make the argument more concrete, we extend the model to incorporate real wage rigidity.
We do this through a simple wage adjustment rule.21 We distinguish between a target wage, wnb
t ,
which is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, and the actual wage, wt, which is a weighted
average of the target wage and last period actual wage. The rule is given by
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)wnb
t + ￿wt￿1;
where ￿ is a partial adjustment parameter that re￿ ects the degree of wage rigidity. When ￿ = 0,
the actual wage corresponds to the Nash bargained wage and we recover the baseline case.
21See Gertler and Trigari (2009) for a model of staggered Nash wage bargaining.
29Figure 9 displays impulse responses for output, unemployment, the worker￿ s and the ￿rm￿ s share
of the surplus under alternative values of the parameter ￿. It shows that the ￿rm￿ s (worker) share
of the surplus decreases (increases) in the aftermath of the shock, with the e⁄ect on the ￿rm and
worker shares being larger the higher is the degree of wage rigidity. We see that, as anticipated
from our intuition above, a higher degree of real wage rigidity tends to dampen the size of both the
output and the unemployment multipliers.
6.4 Debt ￿nancing and distortionary taxes
Thus far we have assumed that government spending is ￿nanced via lump-sum taxes levied on the
household, and that the government budget constraint is balanced in every period. In this section
we wish to explore the implications of distortionary taxation and debt ￿nancing.
The household￿ s budget constraint becomes:
ct + it + Et f￿t;t+1Bt+1g + Bg;t+1 ￿ wtnt(1 ￿ ￿n
t ) + rk;tkt + (1 + rt)Bg;t + ￿t ￿ ￿t; (35)
where ￿n
t is the tax rate on labor income22 and Bg;t is one-period real government debt purchased
in t ￿ 1 and paying o⁄ a net return of rt.
The government budget constraint now reads:
Bg;t+1 + ￿n;twtnt + ￿t = gt + (1 + rt)Bg;t:
The government adjusts each ￿scal instruments according to the following feedback rules:






where ft = ￿n;t, gt, ￿t respectively, and f is the steady state value of ft.
Distortionary taxation on workers￿labor income a⁄ects ￿rms￿hiring decision in two ways. On
the one hand, it reduces the total surplus from employment. The total surplus from the marginal
match is reduced by the amount of the total tax paid, ￿n;twt. On the other hand, it increases the
22We abstract here from capital income and consumption taxes.
30share of the surplus accruing to the ￿rm, that becomes (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿n
t ). This happens because
a unit rise in wages yields a cost to the ￿rm of one unit but a bene￿t to the worker of one unit less
the tax rate. So, the tax rate induces a joint loss to the ￿rm and the worker that can be reduced by
keeping wages low or, equivalently, by keeping the ￿rm￿ s share of the surplus high. To summarize
these e⁄ects, we solve for the total surplus and combine with the hiring equation in presence of

































is a composite term that depends on current and expected future distortionary tax rates. Note
that in the absence of distortionary taxation (￿n
t = 0 for all t), equation (37) coincides with (26).
Distortionary taxation produces two e⁄ects on the hiring equation. For one, a rise in the
current labor income tax rate tends to increase the tax-adjusted marginal value of non-work activity,
!t=(1 ￿ ￿n
t ), lowering the surplus from the match, and therefore discouraging hiring. But in our
context there is an additional (dynamic) e⁄ect captured by the term Tt+1 and re￿ ecting variations
over time of the relative bargaining power. Notice that if distortionary tax rates were constant over
time (￿n
t = ￿n for all t) we would have Tt = 1 for all t, so that distortionary taxation would only
a⁄ect hiring via changing the relative value of non-work to work activity.
Figure (10) compares the baseline model with lump-sum taxes (solid line) with the case in which
government spending is ￿nanced with taxes on labor income and debt stabilization rules as in (36)
are in place (dashed line). In this simulation exercise we assume ￿￿n = ￿￿ = 0:02, ￿g = ￿0:02 and
￿￿n = ￿￿ = 0:91=3.23
The presence of distortionary taxes alters signi￿cantly the response of both output and unem-
ployment to a rise in government spending: both the output and the unemployment multipliers are
23Leeper et al. (2009) estimate, within a DSGE model, feedback coe¢ cients of ￿scal rules for di⁄erent instruments
and ￿nd signi￿cant reaction to government debt. See also Gal￿ and Perotti (2003), Bohn (1998) and Favero and
Monacelli (2005), who report estimates for feedback coe¢ cients to debt of roughly the size we calibrate here.
31reduced relative to the case in which the higher spending is ￿nanced with lump sum taxes only. In
addition, the dynamic response of both output and unemployment is altered: the increase in taxes
necessary to stabilize government debt yields a quicker fall in output relative to the baseline case
and even a rise in unemployment after about one and a half year.
7 Market power and countercyclical markups
Recent contributions (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2009, Hall, 2009) have emphasized that so-called
New Keynesian (NK) models, i.e., models characterized by the presence of imperfect competition
and nominal price rigidity, can be more e⁄ective than the neoclassical growth model in generating
large output multipliers from variations in government spending. The key lies in the behavior of
markups. Under price stickiness, markups are counter-cyclical in light of any shock that boosts
output and therefore the nominal marginal cost. This e⁄ect acts as a shifter of the standard
marginal product of labor schedule, which reinforces the e⁄ect on employment stemming from the
wealth e⁄ect on labor supply. It is therefore interesting to explore the implications of markup
variations for the (un)employment multiplier in the context of our model.
To introduce monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity we follow the modelling strat-
egy adopted in Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2006, 2009). We add to the model a standard monop-
olistically competitive retail sector in which we locate rigidities in price setting. The ￿rms￿sector
where search frictions are located is kept unchanged and is re-labeled as intermediate goods sector.
Retailers buy goods from intermediate goods ￿rms in competitive markets, di⁄erentiate them with
a technology that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and re-sell
them to the households.24 Retailers adjust prices according to a conventional Calvo speci￿cation
where 1 ￿ ￿ denotes each period ￿xed probability of re-setting the price.25
We close the model by postulating a simple interest rate feed-back rule according to which the
monetary authority adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate, rn
t , in response to ￿nal consump-
24On top of retailers and intermediate good ￿rms, ￿nal good ￿rms combine individual retail goods into a ￿nal good
using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
25In the interest of space, we do not describe the model with nominal rigidities. See Trigari (2006, 2009) for details.
32tion goods in￿ ation, ￿t, and output growth:
(1 + rn








with ￿￿ > 1 and ￿y > 0.
Note that the price of intermediate goods in terms of ￿nal goods corresponds to the real marginal
cost of production faced by the retailers, that is, to the inverse price markup. This implies that
the marginal product of labor in the intermediate goods sector expressed in terms of ￿nal goods is
a￿;t = ￿￿1
t at
where ￿t is the price markup. Hence movements in the markup a⁄ect the surplus equation via the
marginal product of labor. In this context, the analog of the expression for the surplus is
Sn;t = a￿;t ￿ !t + ￿Et f(￿ ￿ ￿pt+1)￿t;t+1Sn;t+1g
while the steady state relative value of non-work to work activity in terms of ￿nal goods reads
!￿ = ￿b￿￿1=￿=a￿. Due to price rigidity, counter-cyclical movements in the markup (both current
and future) raise the e⁄ective marginal product of labor. In equilibrium, since hiring depends on
the current and the expected future values of the marginal product of labor, this boosts hiring and
employment.
We have shown above that, under ￿ exible prices, complementarity between consumption and
employment worsens the ability of the model to generate sizeable multipliers (both for output
and employment). In this section we show that, if coupled with price stickiness, the e⁄ect of
complementarity is reversed: if the degree of complementarity is su¢ ciently high, consumption can
even rise and the output multiplier can be largely magni￿ed.
In the baseline case we continue to assume !￿ = 0:9, we set a steady state markup of 16
percent, a four-quarter degree of price stickiness, and monetary policy parameters ￿￿ = 1:5 and
￿y = 0:5=4, in line with a standard Taylor rule (with the output coe¢ cient normalized to monthly
frequency). Figure 11 displays impulse responses of selected variables from the model with four-
33quarter price stickiness under alternative values of the complementarity parameter ￿. Consider
the case of separable preferences ￿rst (￿ = 1). The output multiplier at the peak is about 0:6
whereas the unemployment multiplier rises further, to almost 0:8 (in absolute value). The key
for the expansionary e⁄ect on output derives from the strong fall in the markup, which raises the
current and expected future marginal product of labor, therefore boosting the current hiring rate.
The output multiplier, however, still remains largely below 1.
Consider now the e⁄ect of increasing the degree of complementarity between consumption and
labor. With ￿ = 2, in particular, the output multiplier, at the peak, rises above 1, whereas
the unemployment multiplier is close to 2 (in absolute value). Notice also that the model even
overshoots the value of the unemployment multiplier relative to the data; however, by combining
the baseline NK model with some of the features discussed above, such as unemployment bene￿ts,
or debt ￿nancing under distortionary taxation, one could appropriately dampen that e⁄ect.
Importantly, for a value of ￿ = 2, now consumption rises in response to the government spending
shock. It is important to recall that the econometric ￿scal policy literature is divided on the
e⁄ects of government spending shocks on private consumption: the SVAR strand tends to ￿nd
(as we do and as in Perotti, 2007) that consumption rises signi￿cantly26, whereas the narrative-
approach strand (as in Ramey, 2009) tends to ￿nd that consumption either marginally falls or that
it remains virtually unchanged. Despite the di⁄erences, however, nobody ￿nds that government
spending crowds out private consumption as much as our baseline model with ￿ exible prices and
search frictions implies. Hence it seems desirable to explore the role of modelling features (such as
complementarity) that contribute at least to dampen the equilibrium response of consumption to
government spending.
The intuition for the magni￿cation e⁄ect that we obtained can be best understood in the
limit case of prices being completely rigid, and the monetary policy rule being only responsive to
in￿ ation.27 In that case, the real interest rate must be constant. In turn, this implies that the
marginal utility of consumption must be constant through time:
26Other examples are Gal￿ et al. (2007), Ravn et al. (2007).
27See Monacelli and Perotti (2009) for a related analysis in the context of a standard NK model with non-separable
preferences.
34Uc(ct;nt) = Uc(ct+1;nt+1) = Uc
In equilibrium employment rises: this is a fortiori true in a model with price stickiness, for (as
explained above) falling markups boost the marginal product of labor and in turn the hiring rate.
But for the marginal utility of consumption to remain constant in light of a rise in employment,
consumption must necessarily rise. This complementarity e⁄ect is then stronger the higher is ￿. At
higher levels of ￿ consumption will rise more for any given level of employment, with this requiring
further decreases of the markup and, in equilibrium, higher labor demand. Hence the multiplier
e⁄ect on consumption transfers naturally to employment and to output.
In our model with staggered prices and a more general monetary policy rule, the real interest
rate is obviously not completely ￿xed. Yet, as we see from the picture, this intuition survives, as
long as movements in the real interest rate are not too strong. In this respect, recall also that
parameter ￿ does not only pin down the complementarity between consumption and hours, but
also the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.28 Hence, as ￿ rises, even
in the case of relative large movements in the real interest rate, these would have smaller e⁄ects on
the current marginal utility of consumption.
8 Conclusions
This paper is a ￿rst-step exploration into the e⁄ects of variations of government purchases on the
labor market and unemployment in particular. Our main message is that a baseline real business
cycle model augmented with search and matching frictions has several problems in replicating the
size of the output and unemployment multipliers that we ￿nd in the data. Our theoretical analysis
suggests that a framework with New Keynesian features and complementarity in utility between
consumption and labor holds promise in matching several facts of the transmission of government
spending on the labor market. However, several channels have remained unexplored. We can think
of at least three: ￿rst, endogenous job destruction; second, a labor market participation choice;
28See Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008).
35third, a meaningful role for public employment expenditure. On the latter, Quadrini and Trigari
(2007) and Gomes (2010) are interesting examples.
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Figure 1: Estimated impulse responses from the VAR
41Figure 2
UN























































































months after the shock
firm
household
Figure 3: Responses to a rise of government spending equal to 1% of GDP.



































Investment (% of GDP)
months after the shock
separable utility, w =0.9
Figure 4: Responses to a rise of government spending equal to 1% of GDP.


















Figure 5: Output and unemployment government spending multipliers.
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Figure 6: E⁄ect of varying ￿ on the responses of output and unemployment: top panel ! = 0:4,
row panel ! = 0:9.
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Figure 7: E⁄ect of introducing unemployment bene￿ts on the response of output and unemployment
to a government spending shock.
47Figure 8: Real wage rigidity ampli￿es the e⁄ects of productivity shocks but dampens the e⁄ects of
governments spending shocks.
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Figure 9: E⁄ect of introducing real wage rigidity.
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Figure 10: E⁄ect of introducing distortionary taxation and government debt ￿nancing.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a government spending shock under price stickiness and alternative
degrees of complementarity.
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